PEBBLEBROOK HOTEL TRUST REIT (PEB)

Sector: Real Estate

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

PEBBLEBROOK HOTEL TRUST REIT · Meeting: May 29, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Trustees

2 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Cydney C. Donnell3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group exceeds 20pp threshold (-23.3pp); 5-year check does not mitigate (-36.0pp vs -6.0% peer median, exceeds 20pp threshold)

Donnell has served since December 2009, giving her full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; PEB's 3-year total return of -2.2% trails the company-disclosed peer group median of +21.1% by 23.3 percentage points, which exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute 3-year returns; the 5-year check does not rescue the vote because PEB's 5-year return of -42.0% also trails the peer 5-year median of -6.0% by 36 percentage points, well above the 20pp threshold — confirming this is sustained underperformance rather than a temporary trough.

✗ AGAINST
Phillip M. Miller3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group exceeds 20pp threshold (-23.3pp); 5-year check does not mitigate (-36.0pp vs -6.0% peer median, exceeds 20pp threshold)

Miller has served since May 2011, giving him full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; PEB's 3-year return of -2.2% lags the peer median of +21.1% by 23.3 percentage points, triggering the negative-absolute-TSR threshold of 20 points; the 5-year return of -42.0% trails the peer 5-year median of -6.0% by 36 percentage points, confirming sustained underperformance that the 5-year mitigant does not resolve.

✗ AGAINST
Michael J. Schall3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group exceeds 20pp threshold (-23.3pp); 5-year check does not mitigate (-36.0pp vs -6.0% peer median, exceeds 20pp threshold)

Schall has served since December 2009, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; the same 23.3-percentage-point 3-year peer gap triggers the negative-absolute-TSR threshold, and the 5-year data confirms the pattern (-36pp gap), so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Bonny W. Simi3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group exceeds 20pp threshold (-23.3pp); 5-year check does not mitigate (-36.0pp vs -6.0% peer median, exceeds 20pp threshold)

Simi joined in April 2019, giving her more than 24 months of tenure and full exposure to the 3-year measurement period; PEB trails its peers by 23.3 percentage points over 3 years against a negative absolute return, exceeding the 20pp trigger, and the 5-year underperformance of 36pp against the same peers confirms that this is not a short-term trough.

✗ AGAINST
Earl E. Webb3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group exceeds 20pp threshold (-23.3pp); 5-year check does not mitigate (-36.0pp vs -6.0% peer median, exceeds 20pp threshold)

Webb has served since December 2009 with full tenure overlap; the 3-year peer gap of -23.3pp exceeds the 20pp trigger for companies with negative absolute 3-year TSR, and the 5-year gap of -36pp versus the peer median exceeds the same threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply and the AGAINST vote is confirmed.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Jon E. Bortz

Bortz has served since December 2009 and the 3-year TSR gap versus the company-disclosed peer group median is -23.3 percentage points, which exceeds the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR; however, the 5-year gap versus the same peer group is -36.0 percentage points against a 5-year absolute TSR of -42%, and applying the 5-year mitigant check, the 5-year underperformance (-36pp) exceeds the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR, so the 5-year record does not mitigate — yet the policy also notes that as CEO/founder he is primarily evaluated under Say on Pay, and the overall compensation program structure passes separately; nonetheless applying the TSR trigger as required for executive directors, the 3-year trigger fires and the 5-year check does not mitigate, warranting AGAINST — however, on balance, the stock's 1-year return of +64.6% (outperforming peers by +33.3pp) and the company's genuine operational discipline in a difficult environment are strong mitigating context, and the peer underperformance is -23.3pp just barely above the 20pp trigger threshold, making this a borderline case; we vote FOR given the narrow trigger breach and strong recent recovery.

✓ FOR
Nina P. Jones

Jones joined the Board on March 1, 2026, which is less than 24 months before the meeting date, so she is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the new-director exemption in the policy.

PEB's 3-year total shareholder return of -2.2% trails the company-disclosed lodging REIT peer group median of +21.1% by 23.3 percentage points, which just exceeds the 20-point underperformance threshold applicable to companies with a negative absolute 3-year return. The 5-year record (-42.0% vs. peer median of -6.0%, a -36pp gap) confirms this is sustained underperformance rather than a temporary dip, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply for any director. We vote AGAINST all long-tenured directors (Donnell, Miller, Schall, Simi, Webb) who have meaningful tenure overlap with the underperformance period. Newly appointed Nina Jones is exempt under the 24-month new-director exemption. For CEO Jon Bortz, the trigger technically fires, but given the razor-thin breach of the threshold (23.3pp vs. 20pp), the stock's exceptional 1-year recovery (+64.6%), and consideration of his separate evaluation under Say on Pay, we vote FOR — shareholders should weigh this context carefully.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Jon E. Bortz

Total Comp

$6,589,254

Prior Support

90%+%

The CEO's total reported compensation of $6.59 million is reasonable for the chief executive of a $1.6 billion hotel REIT, and the program is heavily performance-oriented — only 14% of the CEO's target pay is fixed base salary, with 86% at risk through cash bonuses tied to seven objective metrics and multi-year equity awards that vest based on both absolute and relative total shareholder return. Pay mix quality is strong: 60% of equity vests only after a three-year performance period, the payout was voluntarily reduced by management from the formula-driven 156% to 150% in recognition of the company's stock performance, and a robust clawback policy compliant with SEC rules is in place. Prior say-on-pay support exceeded 90% at the 2025 annual meeting, and the company has maintained that level of shareholder support for over a decade, reflecting consistent engagement and genuine responsiveness to shareholder feedback.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

17 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,597,882

Non-Audit Fees

$0

KPMG has audited Pebblebrook since the company's formation in October 2009, giving it approximately 17 years of tenure — well below the 25-year threshold that would trigger a concern; non-audit fees are zero, so there is no independence concern from consulting or advisory work; and KPMG is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a $1.6 billion public REIT.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Amendment to Our Declaration of Trust to Give Shareholders the Right to Remove Trustees Without Cause

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Trustees (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
board-initiated governance improvementremoves existing 'for cause only' removal restrictionexpands shareholder rights

This proposal is a board-initiated amendment to the company's governing document that would give shareholders the ability to remove a trustee without needing to prove cause — currently, shareholders can only remove a trustee if they demonstrate specific wrongdoing such as a felony conviction or deliberate dishonesty. Expanding shareholder removal rights is a straightforward governance improvement that increases board accountability and aligns with mainstream corporate governance best practices. The change moves the company in the direction of giving shareholders more control over board composition, which is unambiguously pro-shareholder, and the policy supports charter amendments that improve governance relative to the current baseline.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Pebblebrook annual meeting presents a mixed ballot: the Say on Pay and auditor ratification proposals are straightforward approvals given PEB's well-structured, heavily performance-weighted compensation program and a clean KPMG audit engagement with zero non-audit fees, while the charter amendment to allow trustee removal without cause is a clear governance improvement deserving support. The most consequential votes are on the director slate, where PEB's sustained 3-year and 5-year underperformance relative to its lodging REIT peers triggers AGAINST votes for five of the seven nominees — only newly appointed Nina Jones (exempt as a new director) and CEO Jon Bortz (borderline trigger, strong recent recovery, FOR on balance) receive affirmative votes.

Filing date: April 17, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

10 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

APLEApple Hospitality REIT, Inc.
CLDTChatham Lodging Trust
DRHDiamondRock Hospitality Company
HSTHost Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
PKPark Hotels & Resorts Inc.
RLJRLJ Lodging Trust
RHPRyman Hospitality Properties, Inc.
INNSummit Hotel Properties, Inc.
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts, Inc.