OREILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC (ORLY)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

OREILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC · Meeting: May 14, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

9

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

9 FOR
✓ FOR
Greg Henslee

Long-tenured Executive Chairman with deep automotive aftermarket expertise; ORLY's 3-year TSR of +64.8% outperforms the disclosed peer group median by +37.2pp, well below the 65pp threshold needed to trigger an against vote, and all other policy screens pass.

✓ FOR
David O'Reilly

Founder-family affiliated director with over 50 years of industry experience; TSR trigger does not fire given strong relative performance, no overboarding, and 100% meeting attendance in 2025.

✓ FOR
Thomas T. Hendrickson

Independent Lead Director and Audit Committee Chair with CPA credentials and deep retail CFO experience; holds one outside public board seat (OLLI), well within limits, and attended 100% of meetings.

✓ FOR
Kimberly A. deBeers

Joined the board in 2025 and is therefore exempt from the TSR performance trigger under the 24-month new-director exemption; brings strong M&A and corporate governance legal expertise from a career at a top global law firm.

✓ FOR
Gregory D. Johnson

Affiliated director who joined the board in 2024 and is therefore exempt from the TSR performance trigger under the 24-month new-director exemption; brings deep operational and supply chain knowledge as former CEO.

✓ FOR
John R. Murphy

Long-tenured independent director and CPA serving as Compensation Committee Chair; current outside board seat at Cadrenal Therapeutics (CVKD) keeps him well within overboarding limits, and he attended 100% of meetings.

✓ FOR
Dana M. Perlman

Independent director with retail finance and omnichannel expertise serving as Governance/Nominating Committee Chair; no overboarding concerns and 100% meeting attendance.

✓ FOR
Maria A. Sastre

Independent director with consumer-operations leadership experience; holds one outside public board seat (General Mills), within policy limits, and attended 100% of meetings.

✓ FOR
Fred Whitfield

Independent director with human capital management and consumer-facing operations experience; no overboarding concerns, no TSR trigger, and 100% meeting attendance.

All nine director nominees receive a FOR vote. ORLY's 3-year price return of +64.8% outperforms the company-disclosed peer group median of +27.6% by +37.2pp, far short of the 65pp threshold required to trigger against votes for a strong-positive-TSR company. No director is overboarded, all directors attended 100% of meetings in 2025, no independence concerns were identified on committee assignments, and two directors (deBeers, G. Johnson) joined within the past 24 months and are exempt from the TSR trigger.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Brad Beckham

Total Comp

$4,231,108

Prior Support

>90%%

CEO Brad Beckham's total compensation of $4,231,108 is reasonable for a CEO of a $76.7 billion market-cap consumer cyclical company, and his pay mix is strongly variable — approximately 74% of his total pay comes from stock option awards and annual cash incentive compensation tied to measurable financial goals (comparable store sales, operating income, and return on invested capital), well above the 50-60% variable pay threshold the policy requires. The annual incentive plan paid out at 146.3% of target, reflecting genuine outperformance against pre-set financial targets — comparable store sales of 4.7% exceeded the 3.0% target and operating income of $3.46 billion exceeded the $3.41 billion target — and this above-target incentive pay is clearly justified given ORLY's 3-year total shareholder return of +64.8%, which outperforms the disclosed peer group median of +27.6% by +37.2pp. Prior Say on Pay support exceeded 90% at the 2025 annual meeting, the company has a strong clawback policy, prohibits hedging and pledging, and the compensation committee engaged an independent consultant (Meridian Compensation Partners).

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

34 yrs

Audit Fees

$2,609,000

Non-Audit Fees

$698,000

auditor tenure gte 25 years

Ernst & Young has audited O'Reilly's financial statements since 1992, a tenure of approximately 34 years, which exceeds the policy's 25-year threshold that triggers an against vote. While the non-audit fee ratio is acceptable — non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $38,000 plus tax fees of $660,000, totaling $698,000) represent about 27% of audit fees ($2,609,000), well below the 50% limit — the lengthy auditor relationship raises concerns about independence and professional skepticism. The proxy notes a lead audit partner rotation occurred in 2025 and the next rotation is scheduled for 2030, which is a modest mitigant, but the policy requires a 'specific and compelling rationale' for continued engagement beyond 25 years and the disclosure does not provide one.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Shareholder Proposal Entitled 'Avoid Brand Damage Due to Corporate Political Spending'

✓ FOR
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistDisclosure
Board recommends: AGAINST
credible governance activist filerdisclosure ask low barcompany scored 4pct on CPA Zicklin indexcompany opposition relies on minimization not existing disclosure

The proposal is submitted by John Chevedden, a well-known individual governance activist with a long track record of filing disclosure-focused proposals that address genuine shareholder concerns — this type of filer is taken seriously under our policy. The ask is purely a disclosure request: publish an annual report on the company's policies and spending related to electoral activities, which is a low bar to support since it does not restrict any business activity and simply asks for transparency that other peer companies (including Ulta Beauty, cited in the peer group) already provide. The company's opposition argues that political spending is minimal and already subject to public disclosure requirements, but it scored only 4 out of 100 on the 2025 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure — one of the most widely cited benchmarks for this kind of transparency — which directly contradicts the claim that adequate disclosure already exists, and the board's response does not dispute this score or commit to any concrete improvement.

Overall Assessment

O'Reilly Automotive's 2026 annual meeting ballot is largely straightforward, with FOR votes on all nine director nominees and the Say on Pay proposal supported by strong stock performance and a well-structured, heavily variable executive pay program. The two departures from board recommendations are an AGAINST on auditor ratification due to Ernst & Young's 34-year tenure far exceeding the policy's 25-year independence threshold, and a FOR on the political spending disclosure shareholder proposal submitted by governance activist John Chevedden, where the company's 4-out-of-100 score on the CPA-Zicklin transparency index undermines its claim that existing public disclosures are adequate.

Filing date: March 27, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

17 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AAPAdvance Auto Parts, Inc.
ANAutoNation, Inc.
AZOAutoZone, Inc.
BJBJ's Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.
KMXCarMax, Inc.
DKSDick's Sporting Goods, Inc.
DGDollar General Corporation
DLTRDollar Tree, Inc.
FASTFastenal Company
GPCGenuine Parts Company
LKQLKQ Corporation
LOWLowe's Companies, Inc.
ROSTRoss Stores, Inc.
SHWThe Sherwin-Williams Company
TSCOTractor Supply Company
ULTAUlta Beauty, Inc.
GWWW.W. Grainger, Inc.