ORION SA (OEC)

Sector: Materials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ORION SA · Meeting: June 25, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of the eight director nominees, each for a term ending on the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders of the Company called to approve the annual accounts of the Company for the financial year ending on December 31, 2026.

1 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Kerry GalvinTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Ms. Galvin has served since August 2018, giving her full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; OEC's 3-year total return of -68.9% trails the company's own peer group median of +2.1% by 71.0 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold that applies when absolute returns are negative, and the 5-year check (OEC -60.0% vs. peer median -4.6%, a gap of -55.4pp, exceeding the 20pp threshold) confirms this is not a recent blip but sustained underperformance, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Paul HuckTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Mr. Huck has served since July 2014, giving him complete overlap with the underperformance period; OEC's 3-year total return of -68.9% trails the peer group median by 71.0 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year gap of -55.4pp against the peer median also exceeds the 20pp threshold, confirming sustained multi-year underperformance with no mitigating 5-year recovery.

✗ AGAINST
Mary LindseyTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Ms. Lindsey joined in July 2020, giving her full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; the 3-year TSR gap of -71.0pp versus the peer median far exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year gap of -55.4pp also exceeds the threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply and the AGAINST vote stands.

✗ AGAINST
Didier MiratonTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Mr. Miraton has served since July 2014 with complete overlap with the underperformance period; the 3-year peer-relative gap of -71.0pp far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold, and the 5-year check also fails (gap of -55.4pp vs. the 20pp threshold), confirming the underperformance is sustained and no downgrade to FOR is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Yi Hyon PaikTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Dr. Paik joined in July 2020, giving him full overlap with the 3-year period; the 3-year peer-relative shortfall of -71.0pp far exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year gap of -55.4pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term record provides no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Corning PainterTSR underperformance triggerexecutive directorpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Mr. Painter, the CEO, has served as a director since October 2018, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; as an executive director he is subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, and OEC's 3-year peer-relative gap of -71.0pp vastly exceeds the 20-point threshold; the 5-year gap of -55.4pp also exceeds the threshold, confirming sustained underperformance under his tenure, and this director vote is independent of the Say on Pay vote.

✗ AGAINST
Dan SmithTSR underperformance triggerpeer group 3yr gap -71.0pp vs 20pp threshold5yr underperformance confirmed

Mr. Smith, the Board Chairman, has served since July 2014 with complete overlap with the underperformance period; the 3-year peer-relative gap of -71.0pp far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold, and the 5-year gap of -55.4pp also exceeds the threshold, confirming prolonged underperformance across his entire tenure as chairman.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Jacqueline Hoogerbruggenew director exempt under 24 months

Ms. Hoogerbrugge joined the board in July 2025, less than 24 months before the meeting date, so she is fully exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under policy; no other disqualifying flags apply.

Seven of eight director nominees warrant an AGAINST vote due to severe and sustained stock underperformance — OEC's 3-year total return of -68.9% trails its own compensation peer group median by 71.0 percentage points, far exceeding the policy's 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns. The 5-year check (gap of -55.4pp against the same peer median) also exceeds the threshold, so no mitigant applies and the underperformance cannot be characterized as a recent blip. The sole exception is Ms. Hoogerbrugge, who joined in July 2025 and is exempt as a director within her first 24 months.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Corning Painter

Total Comp

$3,488,971

Prior Support

N/A

CEO Corning Painter's total reported compensation of approximately $3.49 million is modest for a Basic Materials company of OEC's size and sector, and the pay structure is well-designed for performance alignment — 82% of the CEO's target pay is at-risk, with long-term equity awards split 70% performance-based (using relative total shareholder return, return on capital employed, sustainability, and employee engagement metrics over a three-year period) and only 30% time-based. The company has a meaningful clawback policy in place. While OEC's stock has severely underperformed peers, the pay level itself is not above benchmark for this market cap and sector, and the performance-based equity awards are mechanically tied to that relative total return, meaning executives are already bearing the consequence of the share price decline through reduced incentive payouts — the pay-for-performance structure is working as intended even if outcomes have been poor.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$3,680,000

Non-Audit Fees

$0

Ernst & Young LLP's non-audit fees for 2025 were zero (audit-related fees of $58,000 in 2024 were also minimal), resulting in a non-audit-to-audit fee ratio of 0%, well below the 50% threshold that would trigger a concern; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy so no tenure trigger fires per policy; EY is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of OEC's size; and no material financial restatements were noted.

Overall Assessment

The dominant issue at this annual meeting is severe and sustained stock underperformance: OEC's 3-year total return of -68.9% trails its own disclosed compensation peer group by 71 percentage points — more than three times the policy trigger threshold — and the 5-year record is equally poor, providing no mitigating recovery. As a result, seven of eight director nominees receive an AGAINST vote, with only newly-appointed Ms. Hoogerbrugge exempted under the 24-month new-director rule; the Say on Pay vote is FOR because the CEO's absolute pay level is modest and the incentive structure is genuinely performance-linked, and the auditor ratification is a straightforward FOR given zero non-audit fees and a clean Big 4 engagement.

Filing date: April 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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