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LKQ CORP (LKQ)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

LKQ CORP · Meeting: May 6, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

5

Directors AGAINST

3

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Our Board of Directors

5 FOR/3 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Justin Jude⚑ TSR underperformance trigger named peer group⚑ CEO director subject to same TSR trigger

Jude has served on the board since approximately July 2024 (about 1.9 years), just outside the 24-month exemption threshold; as CEO and director he is subject to the TSR trigger — LKQ's 3-year price return is -41.7% (negative absolute TSR), and the stock has underperformed the XLY sector ETF benchmark by -101.3 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point threshold required to trigger a vote against under the ETF fallback; the proxy discloses a named peer group (used for compensation) but no peer-group TSR data is provided, so the ETF fallback applies, and the trigger fires decisively; a 5-year check does not rescue the vote as LKQ's 5-year return is also negative (-22.4%), meaning the underperformance is not a brief recent dip but a sustained trend.

✗ AGAINST
John W. Mendel⚑ TSR underperformance trigger ETF fallback⚑ tenure exceeds 24 months

Mendel has served on the board for approximately 7.6 years, well beyond the 24-month exemption; LKQ's 3-year price return is -41.7% (negative absolute TSR) and the stock has underperformed the XLY ETF by -101.3 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold; the 5-year return is also negative (-22.4%), confirming this is sustained rather than transient underperformance, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Xavier Urbain⚑ TSR underperformance trigger ETF fallback⚑ tenure exceeds 24 months

Urbain has served on the board for approximately 6.3 years, well beyond the 24-month exemption; LKQ's 3-year price return is -41.7% (negative absolute TSR) and the stock has underperformed the XLY ETF by -101.3 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold; the 5-year return is also negative (-22.4%), so the 5-year mitigant does not apply and the vote remains AGAINST.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Andrew C. Clarke

Clarke joined in mid-2024 (approximately 1.7 years ago), which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; he has strong logistics and CFO experience relevant to LKQ's operations.

✓ FOR
Meg A. Divitto

Divitto joined in mid-2024 (approximately 1.1 years ago), well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; her automotive technology and digital innovation background is relevant to LKQ's strategy.

✓ FOR
Sue Gove

Gove joined on February 5, 2025 (approximately 1.1 years ago), well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; she brings CEO, CFO, and COO experience and qualifies as an audit committee financial expert.

✓ FOR
James S. Metcalf

Metcalf joined in approximately late 2024 (approximately 1.3 years ago), within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he brings public company CEO experience and strong operational and governance credentials.

✓ FOR
Michael S. Powell

Powell joined on February 5, 2025 (approximately 1.1 years ago), well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; his deep insurance industry expertise at Progressive is directly relevant to LKQ's auto parts business.

Of the eight nominees, three long-tenured directors (Jude, Mendel, and Urbain, with 1.9, 7.6, and 6.3 years of board tenure respectively) trigger a vote AGAINST based on LKQ's severe stock underperformance — the stock has fallen 41.7% over three years while the XLY consumer cyclical ETF rose 59.6%, a gap of over 100 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the five remaining nominees are within the 24-month new-director exemption and receive a FOR vote.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Justin Jude

Total Comp

$8,767,864

Prior Support

95%%

CEO Justin Jude received total compensation of approximately $8.8 million in 2025, which is within a reasonable range for a CEO of a $7.5 billion market cap consumer cyclical company with global operations; approximately 89% of his target pay was incentive-based (well above the 50-60% threshold required by policy), with equity awards tied to measurable multi-year performance goals including earnings per share, organic revenue growth, and return on invested capital, and annual bonuses that paid out at only 80% of target reflecting actual business performance falling short in some areas; the prior year say-on-pay vote received 95% support, no structural concerns were identified, and the company maintains a robust clawback policy as required by Dodd-Frank, so the pay program structure passes all policy screens despite the company's poor recent stock performance.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

28 yrs

Audit Fees

$9,571,550

Non-Audit Fees

$1,570,050

⚑ auditor tenure 28 years exceeds 25 year threshold

Deloitte has audited LKQ since 1998, giving it approximately 28 years of continuous tenure, which exceeds the 25-year threshold in our policy; the non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $228,550 plus tax fees of $1,341,500 totaling $1,570,050) represent approximately 16% of core audit fees ($9,571,550), which is well within the 50% limit and does not raise independence concerns on its own; however, the unusually long tenure raises serious questions about whether the auditor can maintain the independence and professional skepticism needed to challenge management, and while the company acknowledges this risk and notes active monitoring, it does not provide a compelling rotation plan or other concrete mitigation sufficient to overcome the policy trigger.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Approval of an Amendment to the Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Provide Stockholders Holding a Combined 25% or More of Our Common Stock with the Right to Request a Special Meeting of Stockholders

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
⚑ governance improvement from no right to 25pct threshold⚑ board responding to prior advisory vote

This proposal improves shareholder rights by moving LKQ from a state where only the President or Board could call special meetings to one where holders of 25% of shares can demand a special meeting — a clear and meaningful governance upgrade; the 25% ownership threshold is consistent with market practice and strikes a reasonable balance between giving shareholders a meaningful voice and preventing small minorities from causing repeated disruptive meetings; the board is directly responding to a 2025 advisory vote in favor of this right, demonstrating appropriate responsiveness to shareholders, and supporting this transition is the correct governance outcome.

Overall Assessment

LKQ's 2026 proxy presents a mixed ballot: three long-tenured directors (including the CEO) receive AGAINST votes due to LKQ's severe multi-year stock underperformance versus the XLY consumer cyclical ETF, while the Say on Pay vote earns a FOR based on a well-structured incentive-heavy pay program; the auditor also receives an AGAINST vote due to Deloitte's 28-year tenure exceeding our 25-year independence threshold, but the charter amendment granting stockholders a 25% special meeting right is a genuine governance improvement and earns a FOR.

Filing date: March 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

18 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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LEALear Corp.
ORLYO'Reilly Automotive, Inc.
RSGRepublic Services, Inc.
URIUnited Rentals, Inc.
WSOWatsco, Inc.
WCCWESCO International, Inc.
GWWW.W. Grainger Inc.