FORTUNE BRANDS INNOVATIONS INC (FBIN)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

FORTUNE BRANDS INNOVATIONS INC · Meeting: May 5, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Three Class III Directors

1 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
A. D. David Mackay3-year TSR trigger: FBIN -31% vs peer median +20.5%, gap of -51.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; tenure since 2011 fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR -51.7% vs peer median +12.5%, gap of -64.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5-year mitigant available

Mackay has served on the board since 2011, meaning his entire tenure overlaps with the severe stock underperformance period. FBIN's 3-year total return is -31%, which is 51.5 percentage points below the compensation peer group median of +20.5% — far exceeding the 20-point threshold that triggers a No vote for directors with negative absolute returns. The 5-year record (-51.7% vs peer median +12.5%, a gap of -64.2pp) also exceeds the threshold, so no long-term mitigant applies, and a vote against is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Stephanie L. Pugliese3-year TSR trigger: FBIN -31% vs peer median +20.5%, gap of -51.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2023 — tenure exceeds 24 months and covers majority of underperformance period; 5-year TSR gap also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant available

Pugliese has served since 2023, which is more than 24 months ago, so the new-director exemption does not apply; her tenure substantially overlaps with the period of significant underperformance. FBIN's 3-year return of -31% trails the peer group median by 51.5 percentage points, well above the 20-point trigger threshold applicable when absolute returns are negative. The 5-year data provides no mitigant as the gap also exceeds the threshold, and a vote against is warranted.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Brendan M. Foley

Foley joined the board in July 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him; he brings relevant consumer goods CEO experience from McCormick & Company and there are no overboarding, attendance, or independence concerns (his one missed meeting is explained by a prior commitment before he joined).

Of the three Class III nominees, Foley is exempt from the TSR trigger as a director appointed within the past 24 months and receives a FOR vote; Mackay and Pugliese both have tenures that meaningfully overlap with FBIN's severe and sustained underperformance versus the compensation peer group — a 3-year return of -31% against a peer median of +20.5% (a -51.5pp gap exceeding the 20pp policy threshold) — and both receive AGAINST votes.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Nicholas I. Fink

Total Comp

$10,476,545

Prior Support

87%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $10.5 million is within a reasonable range for a CEO at a $4.5B industrials company given that the committee held pay flat year-over-year and did not increase base salary or incentive targets. The pay mix is strong: 89% of total target pay is variable and at risk, and 71% is tied to specific financial performance metrics (EPS, operating income margin, working capital efficiency for the annual bonus; EBITDA and ROIC for three-year performance share awards), satisfying the policy requirement that more than 50–60% of pay be performance-based. Although FBIN's stock has underperformed peers, the incentive plan actually self-corrected — the annual bonus paid out at only 14% of target and the 2023–2025 performance share awards paid out at 89.8% of target — demonstrating that variable pay was not awarded above benchmark despite poor stock performance, so the pay-for-performance alignment check does not trigger a No vote; prior Say on Pay support was 87%, well above the 70% threshold.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$5,870,000

Non-Audit Fees

$671,000

Non-audit fees (tax fees of $669,000 plus other fees of $2,000, totaling $671,000) represent approximately 11.4% of audit fees ($5,870,000), well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $4.5B company; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the filing so no tenure trigger can be confirmed, and the policy requires confirmed data to fire that trigger.

Stockholder Proposals

3 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Approval of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Eliminate Supermajority Voting Requirements

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
Removes 75% supermajority vote requirement and replaces with default majority standard under Delaware lawDirect response to shareholder-approved 2025 advisory proposalGovernance improvement that expands shareholder rights

This is a board-proposed charter amendment that eliminates the existing requirement for 75% of outstanding shares to amend key provisions of the certificate of incorporation, replacing it with the standard majority vote required by Delaware law. Eliminating supermajority voting thresholds is a mainstream governance improvement that meaningfully expands shareholder rights and makes the board more accountable to shareholders. The board is acting directly on a shareholder mandate expressed through the 2025 advisory vote, making this a clear pro-shareholder measure that deserves support.

Proposal 5

Approval of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Declassify the Board of Directors

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
Phases out classified board structure over three years, resulting in full annual elections by 2029Governance improvement: transitions from 3-year staggered terms to annual accountability for all directorsAllows removal of directors without cause once board is fully declassified

This board-proposed charter amendment transitions the company from a classified board — where directors serve staggered 3-year terms and can only be removed for cause — to a fully declassified board where all directors stand for annual election by 2029 and can be removed with or without cause. Annual director elections are widely recognized as a core shareholder rights best practice because they make every director accountable to shareholders every year. Even though the transition is phased in over three years rather than immediate, this is a clear and substantial governance improvement that shareholders should support.

Proposal 6

Shareholder Proposal to Elect Each Director Annually

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
Company has already submitted a binding declassification proposal (Proposal 5) on this same ballot addressing the core askChevedden is a credible individual governance activist whose proposals are generally taken seriouslyAdvisory vote would be redundant given Proposal 5 directly implements the requested change

John Chevedden is a well-known individual governance activist with a strong track record of meaningful governance proposals, and annual director elections are a legitimate and important shareholder rights improvement that this policy generally supports. However, the company has placed a binding charter amendment (Proposal 5) on this very ballot that directly implements board declassification on a phased timeline leading to full annual elections by 2029 — which substantively addresses the core ask of this advisory proposal. Voting FOR this redundant advisory proposal while Proposal 5 is available for a binding vote would be duplicative; shareholders should direct their support to Proposal 5, the binding mechanism that will actually deliver the change.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 FBIN ballot presents a mixed picture: the Say on Pay vote earns support because incentive pay self-corrected in line with poor business results and the pay structure is genuinely performance-oriented, but two of the three director nominees (Mackay and Pugliese) receive Against votes due to FBIN's severe and sustained stock underperformance of 51.5 percentage points below the compensation peer group median over three years. The governance proposals — eliminating supermajority voting (Proposal 4) and declassifying the board (Proposal 5) — are both pro-shareholder charter improvements that deserve support, while the Chevedden annual-election proposal (Proposal 6) is redundant given the binding declassification amendment already on the ballot.

Filing date: March 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

21 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ADTADT Inc.
ALLEAllegion plc
AOSA.O. Smith Corporation
CHDChurch & Dwight Co., Inc.
GFFGriffon Corporation
LEGLeggett & Platt, Incorporated
LIILennox International Inc.
MASMasco Corporation
MHKMohawk Industries, Inc.
NWLNewell Brands Inc.
OCOwens Corning
PNRPentair plc
REZIResideo Technologies, Inc.
ROPRoper Technologies, Inc.
SNASnap-On Incorporated
SGISomnigroup International Inc.
SWKStanley Black & Decker, Inc.
CLXThe Clorox Company
WHRWhirlpool Corporation
XYLXylem Inc.
ZWSZurn Elkay Water Solutions Corporation