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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

DOW INC · Meeting: April 9, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

12

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

/12 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Samuel R. Allen3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr TSR gap -64.5pp vs 39.4% peer median also exceeds 20pp threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Allen has served since 2019, giving him full accountability for the 3-year period during which Dow's stock fell roughly 16% while the compensation peer group median rose about 39% — a gap of 55 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point trigger; the 5-year record is similarly weak (gap of ~65 points), so the policy's longer-term mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Gaurdie E. Banister Jr.3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2020 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Banister has served since 2020, covering the entire 3-year underperformance window in which Dow's stock trailed its peer group median by 55 percentage points; the 5-year record shows a similar shortfall, so there is no mitigating long-term track record to offset the near-term underperformance.

✗ AGAINST
Wesley G. Bush3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2018 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Bush has served since 2018, meaning his tenure spans the full 3-year and 5-year underperformance periods; Dow's stock trailed peers by 55 percentage points over 3 years and 64 percentage points over 5 years, both well above the applicable thresholds.

✗ AGAINST
Richard K. Davis3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2015 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Davis has served since 2015 and bears full accountability for the sustained underperformance; Dow's stock trailed the peer median by 55 percentage points over 3 years and 64 percentage points over 5 years, exceeding both thresholds with no long-term mitigant available.

✗ AGAINST
Jerri DeVard3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2022 — tenure overlaps full 3-year measurement period; 5yr gap also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Ms. DeVard joined in 2022, which places her tenure squarely within the 3-year measurement window; Dow's 55-percentage-point shortfall versus peers over that period exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year record offers no relief.

✗ AGAINST
Debra L. Dial3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2021 — tenure overlaps most of 3-year measurement period; 5yr gap also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Ms. Dial joined in 2021, giving her meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance window; the 55-percentage-point gap versus peers far exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year data similarly shows sustained underperformance with no mitigating track record.

✗ AGAINST
Jeff M. Fettig3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2003 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Fettig is the longest-tenured director (since 2003) and bears clear accountability for the sustained multi-year period in which Dow's stock fell while peers rose significantly; with a 55-point 3-year gap and a 64-point 5-year gap, neither threshold is close to being satisfied.

✗ AGAINST
Jim Fitterling3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director and CEO since 2018 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant; executive director subject to same TSR trigger independent of Say on Pay vote

As Chair and CEO since 2018, Mr. Fitterling bears primary accountability for the period of sustained underperformance; the policy explicitly subjects executive directors to the same TSR trigger as independent directors, and with a 55-point 3-year gap and 64-point 5-year gap, both thresholds are clearly exceeded — this vote is independent of the Say on Pay determination.

✗ AGAINST
Jacqueline C. Hinman3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2018 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Ms. Hinman has served since 2018, covering both the 3-year and 5-year measurement windows; Dow trailed its compensation peers by 55 percentage points over 3 years and 64 percentage points over 5 years, with no evidence of a longer-term track record that would offset the shortfall.

✗ AGAINST
Luis Alberto Moreno3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2021 — tenure overlaps most of 3-year measurement period; 5yr gap also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Moreno joined in 2021, placing his tenure within the 3-year underperformance window; the 55-percentage-point gap versus the peer median exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year data shows a comparable shortfall with no mitigating long-term outperformance.

✗ AGAINST
Jill S. Wyant3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2020 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Ms. Wyant has served since 2020, giving her full overlap with the 3-year measurement period; the 55-percentage-point underperformance versus Dow's own compensation peer group far exceeds the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year record provides no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Daniel W. Yohannes3yr TSR trigger: DOW -15.8% vs peer median +39.2%, gap -55.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director since 2018 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5yr gap -64.5pp also exceeds threshold, no 5yr mitigant

Mr. Yohannes has served since 2018, covering both the 3-year and 5-year underperformance periods; with a 55-point gap versus peers over 3 years and a 64-point gap over 5 years, the TSR trigger fires clearly and no mitigating long-term track record applies.

For Analysis

The TSR underperformance trigger fires for all 12 director nominees. Over the past 3 years, Dow's stock fell approximately 16% while the median of its own compensation peer group rose about 39%, a gap of 55 percentage points — well above the 20-point threshold that applies when absolute returns are negative. The 5-year record is equally weak (gap of roughly 64 points), so the policy's mitigant for transient short-term underperformance does not apply to any director. All directors are voted AGAINST.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Jim Fitterling

Total Comp

$19,078,777

Prior Support

92%%

CEO total compensation of approximately $19.1 million is within a reasonable range for the role given Dow's roughly $27 billion market cap, and the prior year Say on Pay vote received strong 92% shareholder support, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response. The pay mix is heavily performance-based — approximately 80% of the CEO's target pay is variable — satisfying the policy's requirement that the majority of senior executive pay be at risk, with long-term incentives (performance stock awards, stock options, and restricted stock) comprising the bulk of that variable portion. While Dow's stock has significantly underperformed peers over the 3-year period, the incentive structure itself uses multi-year relative total shareholder return and ROIC-linked metrics, meaning the pay-for-performance mechanism is functioning as designed; the TSR underperformance concern is addressed through the director election votes rather than the Say on Pay vote under this policy.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$22,366,000

Non-Audit Fees

$4,826,000

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $1,209,000 plus tax fees of $3,617,000 = $4,826,000) represent approximately 22% of core audit fees ($22,366,000), well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Dow's size and complexity, and no material restatements have been disclosed; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the filing so the tenure trigger cannot fire.

Actual Vote Results

8-K filed April 14, 2026

View 8-K ↗

Other Proposals

Proposal 1

Amendment to the Dow Inc. 2019 Stock Incentive Plan to increase shares available for issuance from 125 million to 185 million

✓ Passed

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Dow annual meeting ballot presents significant governance concerns driven by sustained stock underperformance: Dow's shares fell approximately 16% over the past 3 years while the median of its own compensation peer group rose roughly 39%, a 55-percentage-point gap that triggers an AGAINST vote for all 12 director nominees including CEO Jim Fitterling; the Say on Pay vote passes on structure given a strong pay-at-risk mix and 92% prior-year support, while the auditor ratification passes cleanly with non-audit fees at only 22% of core audit fees.

Filing date: February 27, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

20 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

MMM3M Company
ADMArcher Daniels Midland Company
CATCaterpillar Inc.
COPConocoPhillips Company
DEDeere & Company
ECLEcolab Inc.
HONHoneywell International Inc.
JCIJohnson Controls International Plc
KMBKimberly-Clark Corporation
LINLinde PLC
LMTLockheed Martin Corporation
LYBLyondellBasell Industries N.V.
MDLZMondelēz International, Inc.
PFEPfizer Inc.
PPGPPG Industries, Inc.
RTXRTX Corporation
BAThe Boeing Company
BMYThe Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
KOThe Coca-Cola Company
SHWThe Sherwin-Williams Company