CASELLA WASTE SYSTEMS INC CLASS A (CWST)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

CASELLA WASTE SYSTEMS INC CLASS A · Meeting: June 4, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Four Class II Directors

2 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Michael L. BattlesTSR underperformance trigger: CWST 3-year return -5.2% vs ^RUT 3-year return +54.7%, gap of -59.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director joined 2019, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period5-year TSR mitigant does not apply: CWST 5-year return +20.1% vs ^RUT 5-year return not provided but proxy discloses CWST at $158.10 vs $100 base, while Russell 2000 at $134.40 vs $100 base over same period — CWST outperforms on 5-year basis, mitigant appliesOverboarding check: Battles is Co-CEO of Clean Harbors — as a sitting CEO he may hold no more than 1 outside public board seat; his service on CWST board triggers the sitting-CEO overboarding rule

Michael Battles is currently a sitting CEO (Co-CEO and Co-President of Clean Harbors, Inc.), and under our policy a sitting CEO may not serve on more than one outside public company board; his presence on the Casella board triggers the overboarding rule, warranting a AGAINST vote independent of TSR considerations. Additionally, while the 3-year TSR trigger fires (CWST -5.2% vs ^RUT +54.7%, a gap of -59.9pp against a 30pp threshold), the 5-year record is positive and CWST outperforms the ^RUT over five years, which would otherwise mitigate the 3-year underperformance, but the overboarding concern alone is sufficient grounds for an AGAINST vote.

✗ AGAINST
Joseph G. DoodyTSR underperformance trigger: CWST 3-year return -5.2% vs ^RUT +54.7%, gap of -59.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director joined 2004, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period5-year TSR mitigant check: CWST 5-year price return +20.1% vs ^RUT 5-year return (proxy table: Russell 2000 at $134.40 vs $100 over 5 years = +34.4%); CWST underperforms ^RUT by approximately 14pp over 5 years, which is below the 50pp threshold for low-positive absolute 5-year TSR — mitigant APPLIES, downgrade to FOR

Joseph Doody has served since 2004 and his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period where CWST's stock fell approximately 5% while the ^RUT (Russell 2000) rose roughly 55%, a gap of nearly 60 percentage points that exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold. However, applying the 5-year mitigant: CWST's 5-year return of approximately +58% (per the proxy's $100 to $158.10 comparison) outpaces the ^RUT's 5-year return of approximately +34% ($100 to $134.40), meaning the 5-year gap is positive for CWST — the 3-year underperformance appears to be a recent development within an otherwise strong longer-term track record, so the policy requires a downgrade to FOR. Vote is FOR on the 5-year mitigant basis.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Edmond R. ColettaDirector joined January 1, 2026 — within the 24-month new-director exemption period; TSR trigger does not apply

Edmond Coletta was appointed to the board effective January 1, 2026, making him a brand-new director who joined fewer than 24 months ago; our policy exempts directors in their first 24 months from the TSR trigger to give them reasonable time to contribute before being held accountable for prior performance. He brings directly relevant experience as Casella's own President and CEO, and there are no overboarding, attendance, independence, or other concerns.

✓ FOR
Emily Nagle GreenTSR underperformance trigger fires on 3-year basis; 5-year mitigant applies — CWST outperforms ^RUT over 5 years

Emily Nagle Green has served since 2012 and the 3-year TSR trigger fires (CWST -5.2% vs ^RUT +54.7%, gap of -59.9pp vs 30pp threshold), but the 5-year mitigant applies because CWST's 5-year return of approximately +58% exceeds the ^RUT's approximately +34% over the same period, indicating the recent 3-year underperformance is a transient trough within an otherwise adequate longer-term record. No overboarding, attendance, independence, or qualifications concerns are present.

Of the four Class II director nominees, Michael Battles receives an AGAINST vote due to the overboarding rule — as a sitting CEO (Co-CEO of Clean Harbors), he may not serve on more than one outside public board. The other three nominees pass the policy screens: Coletta is exempt as a new director within his first 24 months; Doody and Nagle Green both trigger the 3-year TSR underperformance test (CWST -5.2% vs ^RUT +54.7%, a 59.9pp gap vs a 30pp threshold) but both benefit from the 5-year mitigant because CWST's 5-year stock return of approximately +58% meaningfully outpaces the ^RUT's approximately +34%, showing the recent underperformance is a recent rather than sustained phenomenon.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

John W. Casella

Total Comp

$4,405,946

Prior Support

96%%

The prior year say-on-pay vote received 96% support, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response, and the company maintains a well-structured pay program: over 75% of equity awards are performance-based stock awards with meaningful three-year financial goals (Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Adjusted EBITDA) plus a relative total shareholder return multiplier tied to the ^RUT (Russell 2000 Index), and the annual bonus paid out at only 72% of target reflecting actual performance that fell short in two of four metrics. John W. Casella's total reported compensation was $4,405,946, and while pay-for-performance alignment is evaluated cautiously given the stock's recent 3-year decline relative to the ^RUT, the incentive structure explicitly uses the ^RUT as its TSR benchmark and the 2023 performance stock awards vested at 123.3% of target reflecting genuine financial outperformance, suggesting the variable pay structure is functioning as intended rather than paying executives regardless of outcomes. The company also has a meaningful clawback policy adopted in 2023, no problematic pay practices, and fixed salary represents a minority of total compensation for all named executives.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

RSM US LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,079,159

Non-Audit Fees

$0

RSM US LLP charged $2,079,159 in audit fees for fiscal 2025 and zero in non-audit fees (no audit-related fees, no tax fees, and no other fees), meaning the non-audit fee ratio is 0% — well within the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns. Auditor tenure is not explicitly disclosed in the proxy, so the tenure trigger cannot fire under our policy. RSM is a large national accounting firm appropriate for a company of Casella's size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Casella Waste Systems annual meeting presents three standard proposals; the most significant governance concern is Michael Battles' overboarding as a sitting CEO serving on an outside board, which triggers an AGAINST vote under the policy, while the say-on-pay program earns a FOR vote for its strong performance-based design despite the company's recent 3-year stock underperformance versus the ^RUT (Russell 2000). The auditor ratification is straightforward with zero non-audit fees paid to RSM US LLP, and the three remaining director nominees all receive FOR votes after the 5-year TSR mitigant is applied to the two longer-tenured directors whose 3-year underperformance appears transient within a positive 5-year track record.

Filing date: April 17, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

1 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

^RUT__INDEX_BENCHMARK__:Russell 2000 Index