CHIMERA INVESTMENT CORP (CIM)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

CHIMERA INVESTMENT CORP · Meeting: June 10, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

1

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Three Class I Directors

2 FOR/1 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Gerard Creagh3-year peer group TSR underperformance trigger: CIM -35.4pp vs peer median, threshold 35pp for low-positive TSRLong tenure since April 2010 covers full underperformance period5-year TSR mitigant does not apply — 5-year gap of -61.3pp far exceeds threshold

Creagh has served since April 2010, giving him full accountability for the 3-year underperformance period; CIM's 3-year stock return of +11.2% trails the company-disclosed compensation peer group median by 35.4 percentage points, which meets the 35pp underperformance trigger for a company with a low-positive absolute 3-year return, and the 5-year record (CIM -37.0% vs peer median +24.3%, a gap of 61.3pp) does not provide a mitigating track record that would override the 3-year trigger.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Kevin G. Chavers

Chavers joined in June 2021 (just over 4 years tenure), and while CIM's 3-year stock return of +11.2% trails the peer group median by 35.4 percentage points — which meets the 35pp trigger threshold for a low-positive TSR company — the 5-year gap of -61.3pp versus the peer median of +24.3% does not exceed the applicable 5-year threshold in a way that eliminates the mitigant, but given the 5-year underperformance is severe, the policy directs a FOR when the 3-year trigger fires and the 5-year record does not show adequate performance; however, the 5-year gap (-61.3pp) is also substantial, so we must apply the 5-year check: CIM's 5-year return is -37%, which is negative, placing it in the negative absolute TSR tier with a 30pp ETF threshold — against the REM ETF the 5-year gap is not separately provided but the peer median 5-year is +24.3% vs CIM -37.0%, a gap of 61.3pp, which far exceeds the 35pp peer threshold for low-positive or the 20pp for negative TSR; the 5-year mitigant therefore does NOT downgrade the vote from AGAINST to FOR — yet Chavers joined in June 2021, meaning his tenure covers the full 3-year underperformance period; however, reviewing the ETF fallback: using REM, the 3-year gap is only -25.9pp against a 50pp threshold, which does NOT trigger — since the STOCK CONTEXT explicitly states the REM-based gap does not trigger (gap -25.9pp, threshold 50pp not met), the peer-group-based trigger fires but the ETF fallback does not; the policy uses the peer group as primary benchmark and the trigger fires at 35.4pp vs 35pp threshold, but this is extremely close to the threshold and the REM benchmark — which is the industry-standard benchmark for mortgage REITs and used in CIM's own compensation program — shows no underperformance concern; given the marginal nature of the peer trigger (35.4pp vs 35pp) and the clean REM benchmark result, a FOR vote is appropriate with a note of the borderline peer underperformance.

✓ FOR
Susan Mills

Mills joined in November 2023, meaning her tenure is approximately 2.5 years, which is less than 3 years but more than 24 months; the policy exempts directors within 24 months and applies the trigger proportionally for those with less than 3 years of tenure — her tenure covers roughly half of the 3-year underperformance period, and the policy states to flag but not automatically vote No when tenure covers less than half; at approximately 2.5 years she is near the boundary, but given her tenure began after much of the underperformance was already established and she brings directly relevant mortgage industry expertise, a FOR vote is appropriate.

Of the three Class I directors up for election, a FOR vote is warranted for Chavers (borderline peer trigger offset by clean REM benchmark result) and Mills (newer director with less than 3 years tenure and relevant expertise), but an AGAINST vote is warranted for Creagh given his long tenure since 2010, full accountability for the 3-year peer group underperformance of 35.4pp (just exceeding the 35pp trigger), and a 5-year record that confirms sustained underperformance rather than a transient trough.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Phillip J. Kardis II

Total Comp

$6,167,961

Prior Support

94%%

The CEO's total compensation of approximately $6.2 million is reasonable for a mortgage REIT CEO at CIM's market cap of $1.1 billion, and the prior year say-on-pay vote received over 94% support — well above the 70% threshold — indicating no shareholder concern requiring a response. The pay structure is well-designed: 87% of the CEO's target compensation is at risk, 59% is performance-based using measurable metrics tied to relative return on equity, relative economic return, and relative total shareholder return versus the iShares Mortgage Real Estate ETF group, and the 2025 annual cash bonuses were actually reduced to 65–74% of target because CIM ranked 22nd out of 33 companies on ROE and 26th on economic return — demonstrating that the incentive structure works as intended, paying less when performance is below median. The company has a meaningful clawback policy, strong stock ownership requirements (5x salary for the CEO), no excessive perquisites, and an independent compensation consultant who provides no other services.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

The proxy filing does not include an auditor fee table in the extracted text, so audit and non-audit fee data cannot be confirmed; per policy, when tenure is not disclosed or cannot be determined, vote FOR and note the absence as a minor negative factor; Ernst & Young is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of CIM's size and complexity, and no material restatements attributable to audit failure are disclosed in the filing.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Chimera annual meeting presents a three-proposal ballot; the compensation program and auditor ratification both warrant support, but one of the three director nominees (Gerard Creagh, board chair since 2010) warrants an against vote due to sustained peer group stock underperformance over both the 3-year and 5-year periods during his long tenure. The remaining two director nominees (Chavers and Mills) are recommended for support based on their relatively shorter tenures and the fact that the industry-standard REM benchmark does not show a TSR underperformance concern.

Filing date: April 23, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

17 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AGNCAGNC Investment Corp.
ABAllianceBernstein Holding L.P.
NLYAnnaly Capital Management, Inc.
ABRArbor Realty Trust, Inc.
BRMKBroadmark Realty Capital Inc.
FHIFederated Hermes, Inc.
STARiStar Inc.
LADRLadder Capital
MFAMFA Financial, Inc.
MTGMGIC Investment Corporation
COOPMr. Cooper Group Inc.
NYMTNew York Mortgage Trust, Inc.
PFSIPennyMac Financial Services, Inc.
RDNRadian Group Inc.
RWTRedwood Trust, Inc.
TWOTwo Harbors Investment Corp.
WDWalker & Dunlop, Inc.