CBL ASSOCIATES PROPERTIES INC (CBL)

Sector: Real Estate

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

CBL ASSOCIATES PROPERTIES INC · Meeting: May 21, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

7

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

7 FOR
✓ FOR
Stephen D. Lebovitz

CBL's 3-year total return of +123.4% outperforms the ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) by +106.1 percentage points, well above the 65-point threshold required to trigger an against vote for a strong-positive-TSR company, so no TSR underperformance flag applies; no overboarding, attendance, or independence concerns are present.

✓ FOR
Marjorie L. Bowen

No TSR underperformance trigger fires given CBL's strong outperformance of ^FNER; Ms. Bowen is independent, chairs the Audit Committee, is designated a financial expert, and has no attendance, overboarding, or familial-relationship issues.

✓ FOR
David J. Contis

No TSR underperformance trigger fires; Mr. Contis is independent, serves as Non-Executive Chairman, holds two outside public board seats (Equity Lifestyle Properties and Acosta Verde, which is listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange), which does not exceed the four-seat limit, and has no attendance or other disqualifying flags.

✓ FOR
David M. Fields

No TSR underperformance trigger fires; Mr. Fields is independent, chairs the Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, holds one outside public board seat (EastGroup Properties), and has no attendance, overboarding, or other disqualifying flags.

✓ FOR
Robert G. Gifford

No TSR underperformance trigger fires; Mr. Gifford is independent, chairs the Compensation Committee, serves as an Audit Committee financial expert, and has no attendance, overboarding, or other disqualifying flags.

✓ FOR
Jeffrey A. Kivitz

No TSR underperformance trigger fires; Mr. Kivitz joined in August 2022 and is independent (board reviewed Canyon Capital relationship and determined it does not compromise independence), holds no other public board seats, and has no attendance or other disqualifying flags.

✓ FOR
Michael A. Torres

No TSR underperformance trigger fires; Mr. Torres joined in June 2023, is independent, holds no other public board seats listed on major exchanges, and has no attendance or other disqualifying flags.

All seven director nominees receive a FOR vote. CBL's 3-year price return of +123.4% outperforms the ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) by +106.1 percentage points, far exceeding the 65-point threshold required to trigger an against vote for companies with strong positive absolute returns, so no TSR-based concerns arise for any director. No overboarding, attendance, independence, or familial-relationship flags are triggered across the slate.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Stephen D. Lebovitz

Total Comp

$4,604,645

Prior Support

99%%

Prior shareholder support for the pay program has been exceptionally strong, with 99% approval in both 2024 and 2025, well above the 70% threshold that would require a negative response. The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $4.6 million is reasonable for a retail REIT CEO at CBL's $1.4 billion market cap level, and the pay mix is heavily weighted toward variable, performance-based pay — the long-term incentive program uses a combination of time-vesting restricted stock and performance stock awards tied to both absolute and relative total shareholder return over a 3-year period, satisfying the policy's requirement for meaningful performance conditions. Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: CBL delivered a 37% total return to shareholders in 2025 and a 3-year return of +123.4%, significantly outperforming the ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) and the disclosed compensation peer group median, supporting above-target incentive payouts.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

24 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,515,000

Non-Audit Fees

$544,183

Non-audit fees for 2025 (tax compliance $270,000 + tax consulting $101,743 + other fees $3,790 + audit-related fees $168,650 = $544,183) represent approximately 35.9% of audit fees ($1,515,000), comfortably below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns. Deloitte has served since May 2002, giving approximately 24 years of tenure, which is just below the 25-year threshold that would trigger a no vote, so no tenure flag fires. No material restatements are disclosed, and Deloitte as a Big 4 firm is fully adequate for a $1.4 billion market-cap company.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 CBL annual meeting presents a clean ballot with no significant governance or compensation concerns: all seven directors receive FOR votes given CBL's exceptional stock performance that far outpaces the ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) benchmark, Deloitte's audit fees and tenure are within acceptable bounds, and the executive pay program earns near-unanimous prior shareholder approval backed by strong pay-for-performance alignment. No stockholder proposals are on the ballot.

Filing date: April 22, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

11 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AKRAcadia Realty Trust
AHRTAH Realty Trust, Inc.
CTOCTO Realty Growth, Inc.
IVTInvenTrust Properties Corp.
KRGKite Realty Group Trust
PECOPhillips Edison & Company
ROICRetail Opportunity Investments Corp.
SITCSITE Centers Corp.
SKTTanger Inc.
MACThe Macerich Company
UEUrban Edge Properties